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The Bitter Pill: Austerity, Debt, and the Attack 
on Europe's Welfare States
Howard Karger
University of Queensland, Australia 
School of Social Work and Human Services
There is a general belief among may European policymakers that 
the current debt problem in some Eurozone countries is caused 
by the unsustainable levels of governmental spending required 
to maintain overly generous welfare state programs, a bloated 
public sector, overly generous pension levels, state subsidies, 
and low user fees for services. Their proposed solution lies in 
implementing stringent austerity measures designed to disci-
pline debt-ridden governments by cutting public budgets, reduc-
ing the number of public sector workers, curbing social benefits, 
and sharply narrowing the scope of the welfare state. Based on 
a belief in ‘expansionary austerity,’ this approach repudiates a 
key Keynesian principle for dealing with a recession—namely, 
the use of government spending to pursue full employment. 
This paper will examine the austerity measures forced upon 
several heavily indebted European nations by the ‘Troika’—
the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Also examined 
will be the introduction of components of the IMF and World 
Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) into the Euro-
zone context, and the resulting social and political instability.
Key words: austerity, European Commission, European Central 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Structural Ad-
justment Programs, welfare state, Keynes
A tense consensus existed in Western nations around the 
view that Keynesian economics (and the modern welfare 
state it spawned) has provided the social and political stabil-
ity necessary for economic growth. Even in the U.S., where 
Keynesianism is relentlessly attacked by conservative econo-
mists, policymakers and think tanks, the critique fell by the 
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wayside as the Congress turned to Keynesian demand-side 
measures to shore up an economy crippled by the global fi-
nancial crisis (GFC) (Blinder & Zandi, 2010). 
Desperate times required measures which would have 
been unthinkable only five years earlier. The 2009 Keynesian-
inspired and stimulus-based $840 billion American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) created jobs, provided eco-
nomic relief for those hard-hit by the recession, funded infra-
structure (e.g., education, health, energy) growth and mainte-
nance, expanded unemployment benefits, and used federal tax 
incentives to stimulate consumption. Unlike the Europeans, 
U.S. conservatives stopped short of demanding the large-scale 
layoff of public sector workers, and Congress avoided devas-
tating cuts in welfare programs. 
This approach stood in sharp contrast to the European 
choice of austerity over stimulus. Ironically, the European 
bankers and policymakers—not the Americans—led the 
charge to reduce the size and scope of the public sector, dis-
mantle key welfare functions, and diminish the public’s expec-
tations around state provision of services. Although U.S. con-
servatives loaded the anti-Keynesian ammunition, European 
policymakers fired the gun. 
Expansionary Austerity
Harvard professors Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna 
maintain that since 1980 large and decisive spending cuts have 
been followed by economic growth (Coy, 2010). Specifically, 
they argue that “spending cuts adopted to reduce deficits 
have been associated with economic expansions rather than 
recessions” (cited in Berman, 2011, p. 12). They note that aus-
terity measures stimulate growth by placating bond markets 
(lowering interest rates and encouraging investment), and 
by reassuring citizens that harsher fiscal adjustments will 
not be needed later, thereby stimulating consumer spending. 
Austerians like Alesina and Ardagna argue that spending cuts 
are a better way to shrink deficits (and stimulate growth) than 
tax increases (Coy, 2010). Alesina and Ardagna’s (2009) theo-
ries were debunked by The Economist, the IMF and the Center 
for Budget and Policy Priorities, who found that austerity mea-
sures resulted in increased growth in only nine of the 107 cases 
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cited (Avent, 2010; Berman, 2011). An IMF report further de-
bunked Alesina and Ardagna’s theories by finding that when 
measured correctly, austerity was contractionary rather than 
expansionary (Guajardo, Leigh, & Pescatori, 2011).
In their 2010 influential paper, ‘Growth in a Time of Debt,’ 
Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 
maintained that government stimulus programs only exacer-
bate debt problems and should be quickly replaced by auster-
ity measures (2011). The crux of their argument was that when 
a nation’s debt reaches 90 percent of its GDP, it leads to un-
manageable interest costs and becomes a drag on an economy. 
When Thomas Herndon, a graduate student at the University 
of Massachusetts, found errors in Reinhart and Rogoff’s Excel 
spreadsheet data, the authors maintained that despite the error, 
high debt levels lead to slow economic growth. Economist 
Miles Kimball crunched Reinhart and Rogoff’s data and found 
no evidence for their conclusions. Economist Arindrajit Dube 
found evidence that Reinhart and Rogoff had reversed the re-
lationship—slow growth causes higher debt, not the other way 
around (Gongloff, 2013). 
Austerian-based academic papers were greeted uncriti-
cally because they provided the ammunition conservative 
policymakers needed—namely, cutting spending and welfare 
state functions in a depressed economy will spur on economic 
growth. This orientation disintegrated under serious academ-
ic scrutiny and the real-world experiences of countries that 
adopted austerity measures. Ari Berman (2011) attributes the 
austerian influence to an influential and aggressive ‘austerity 
class’—a center-right coalition of politicians, policy analysts 
and technocrats—who have appointed themselves the ‘impar-
tial’ custodians of economic policy. Their goal is to protect the 
investments of banks over the well-being of citizens, and their 
claims are legitimized by think tanks who warn that high debt 
will lead to a national bankruptcy. 
The Attack on the European Welfare States
The Eurozone debt crisis led economically strong nations, 
like Germany, to implement fiscal oversight and control of their 
less well-off southern European neighbors. This oversight pres-
sured smaller and weaker economies into implementing tough 
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austerity measures and some of the deepest public sector cuts 
in a generation. The oversight also highlighted the hypocrisy 
of the stronger economies. For instance, when the euro was 
introduced in the 1990s, Germany insisted on a guarantee that 
Eurozone countries would adopt sound fiscal principles, in-
cluding restricting their total borrowing to less than 3 percent 
of GDP with debts of less than 60 percent. The second criteria 
was dropped, since Germany’s debt to GDP ratio was above 60 
percent (Knight, 2011). 
There is little doubt that many European nations are in 
the midst of a debt crisis and a recession. Some are even in 
a depression (Krugman, 2013). Despite this, the Eurozone 
is debating whether a recession or governmental debt is the 
biggest problem. The moribund economies of Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal and others have resulted in diminished 
market confidence, as evidenced by the high (and often unsus-
tainable) interest rates they are forced to offer on their bonds 
(BBC News, 2011a). The hope of stronger EU nations is that 
economically fragile economies will step back from the abyss 
without defaulting on their debt. To accomplish this goal, the 
27 EU member states set a target to cut deficits to no more than 
3 percent of GDP by 2014-2015 (BBC News, 2011a). Meeting 
that goal would require Eurozone nations to enact strident 
austerity measures. 
Cyprus
Cyprus was an example for other indebted nations who 
might not take austerity seriously enough. The EU and IMF 
loan bailout deal for Cyprus included deep spending cuts, 
overhauling outdated state companies, and the effective con-
fiscation of billions of euros deposited in Cypriot banks. In ex-
change for a $13.2 billion emergency aid package, Cyprus was 
forced to agree to EU demands that it basically confiscate up 
to 60 percent of a depositor’s holdings above $132,460 held in 
two of the country’s largest banks (Bank of Cyprus and Laiki 
Bank). In turn, Laiki Bank was dissolved and merged into the 
Bank of Cyprus (which also absorbed Laiki’s crippling billion 
dollar debt). The 2013 austerity measures resulted in a 16.3 
percent unemployment rate (more than 30 percent for those 
under 25). The bailout package essentially converted a banking 
crisis into a recession, as the IMF predicted a 9 percent drop 
in Cyprus’s 2013 GDP (some economic modelling suggests 24 
percent) (Higgins, 2013). 
Greece
Greece typifies the economic basket case of some south-
ern European nations. Despite huge bailouts from the EU and 
the IMF, some economists fear that it will be impossible to cut 
Greece’s 2013 $410 billion debt (160 percent of GDP) without 
defaulting. Moreover, despite severe austerity measures (or 
perhaps because of them), Greece’s debt grew by 24 percent 
between 2012 and 2013. This was the largest rise in the EU, 
which saw the debt of 24 out of 27 member states increased 
over the 12-month period (Ekathimerini.com, 2013). Since 
2010, Greece has been frozen out of the international financial 
markets because of its debt and weak economy, and has been 
kept afloat and inside the Eurozone solely through a $318.2 
billion EU and IMF bailout (Papachristou & Maltezou, 2013).
Despite Greece’s weak economy, the EU and IMF pres-
sured it into adopting severe austerity measures as a precondi-
tion for a bailout (BBC News, 2011a). The first round of aus-
terity measures led to a wave of protests (some violent) and 
crippling strikes. In an attempt to cut $65 billion by 2015, un-
popular austerity measures included a new property tax, the 
suspension of 30,000 civil servants on partial pay, deep cuts in 
public employment, and the sale of state assets. Another $41 
billion in budget savings was expected to be realized through 
personal and business tax increases and spending cuts. Some 
of the new taxes affected people earning as little as $12,000 a 
year. 
Opponents claimed that the harsh conditions set out by 
lenders condemned Greece to years of painful spending cuts 
and job losses, a prophecy borne out by the 2013 high 27.6 
percent unemployment rate (60 percent for those 25 and under) 
(BBC News, 2011a; Higgins, 2013; Reuters, 2013a; Segall, 2011). 
To add salt to the wound, the promised Eurozone aid to Greece 
of $315 billion was parceled out in tranches to make sure 
the country adhered to the conditions laid out by the Troika 
(Kitsantonis, 2013).
Greece’s austerity-driven contraction wreaked havoc on 
the overall economy. The IMF—which helped coerce Greece 
into austerity—grossly underestimated the pain. In its 2013 
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report, the IMF acknowledged that Greece’s economic contrac-
tion between 2009 and 2012 was around 17 percent, instead of 
its forecast of 5.5 percent. 
Greece adopted yet another round of austerity measures in 
2013 which called for thousands of civil service workers to face 
layoffs and wage cuts. The plan specifically called for putting 
25,000 civil servants (e.g., teachers, municipal police officers, 
school janitors and others) into a “mobility plan” that docked 
their wages ahead of involuntary transfers or outright dis-
missals. These austerity measures were intended to satisfy EU 
finance ministers and pave the way for the release of $9 billion 
in rescue loans. The response was predictable—thousands of 
Greeks demonstrated against the plan (Kitsantonis, 2013).
Italy
Italy had a public debt of more than $2.6 trillion and a debt-
to-GDP ratio of 130 percent in 2013. This was coupled with a 
decline of 1.5 percent in the GDP, further pushing Italy into a 
recession that began in 2011 (Totaro, 2013). 
Before leaving office, the former Berlusconi government 
adopted an austerity package worth about $91 billion that in-
cluded raising healthcare fees, cuts to regional subsidies, cuts 
in family tax benefits, and cuts in the pensions of high earners. 
A second round of austerity measures worth $40 billion was 
developed by former Prime Minister Mario Monti in 2011. 
Monti’s measures included: raising sales taxes; increasing the 
wealth tax on property and assets, including second homes, 
yachts, private jets and luxury cars; and curbing tax evasion 
(equal to about 17 percent of Italy’s GDP). (Tax evasion is also 
a big problem in Greece.) These measures also called for public 
sector salary cuts and limiting new hires (i.e., only one em-
ployee replaces every five that leave). The 2011 reforms raised 
the pension age to 62 for women (rising to 66 in 2018) and 66 
for men. Pension payments lost their value when they were 
de-linked from inflation for all but the lowest payments (BBC 
News, 2011a; BBC News, 2011b). Lastly, the VAT was increased 
to 23 percent. There are two major components to addressing 
debt: cutting spending and raising taxes. When broken down, 
roughly $17 billion of the $40 billion in cuts fell on pensions 
and local authorities, while $23 billion was recouped through 
tax increases (Nardelli, 2011). 
One of the areas hit hardest by austerity measures is health 
care. Italians saw out-of-pocket healthcare costs grow by 160 
percent from 2005 to 2011, with further increases of copay-
ments expected in the foreseeable future. The increased copay 
may help explain a 9 percent reduction in pharmaceutical ex-
penditures in 2012 (Benassi, 2013). 
While Monti’s austerity policies helped bring the budget 
deficit closer to EU guidelines, it also led to a recession that 
pushed the jobless rate to 12.5 percent (youth unemployment 
hit 38 percent), a 20-year high (Totaro, 2013). In 2013, disgrun-
tled Italian voters overwhelmingly rejected the austerity mea-
sures of the Monti government and the EU. Monti’s electoral 
slate received only 10 percent of the vote; roughly 55 percent 
of the electorate voted for political parties that rejected the EU 
reforms (Schwarz, 2013).
Portugal
Portugal is one of the more economically problematic 
Eurozone nations. Its 2013 debt was $271 billion, or 124 percent 
of its GDP, a number which is expected to rise (Bugge, 2011; 
countryeconomy.com, 2013). As a result, Portugal had to pay 
about 5.4 percent interest rate on its bonds in late 2013, one 
of the highest rates in Europe. Portugal became the third 
Eurozone country to receive an EU and IMF bailout of $103 
billion in 2011 (Barley, 2011). 
In exchange for the bailout, Portugal adopted severe aus-
terity measures that included: increasing the work week of 
public employees to 42 hours (one of the longest in the EU) 
without extra pay; sharp cuts in public sector wages, including 
a 5 percent cut for top public sector wage earners; the suspen-
sion of holiday and year-end bonuses for civil servants and 
pensioners; tax hikes for high earners; a VAT rise; and cuts in 
health, welfare and education spending. Portugal also slashed 
its military budget (BBC News, 2011a; PressTV, 2011a). Taken to-
gether, these austerity measures helped drive Portugal deeper 
into a recession, as its economy contracted by 2.3 percent in 
2013 (a third consecutive year of recession). Unemployment hit 
a record high of 18 percent (Thompson, 2013; PressTV, 2011b). 
Public reaction to the austerity measures, combined with the 
moribund economy, and the high unemployment rate, forced a 
governmental crisis and the resignation of the finance minister 
in 2013 (Hesse & Zuber, 2013).
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Spain
Spain is an important Eurozone nation. Its economy is 
five times larger than Greece’s and accounts for 12 percent of 
the Eurozone’s combined GDP. Spain’s population is roughly 
twice the size of bailed-out Portugal, Ireland and Greece com-
bined. Hence, Spain’s economic success or failure will have a 
major impact on the future of the Eurozone (Tremlett, 2012). 
Similar to other Eurozone nations, Spain’s GDP contract-
ed by 1.5 percent in 2013. Its budget deficit was 6.5 percent 
of GDP compared to EU’s target of 3 percent (CNBC, 2013). 
Unlike other troubled Eurozone nations, its 2013 public debt 
ratio to GDP was 85 percent, lower than the UK and France, 
and close to Germany’s 82 percent. At the same time, Spain’s 
2013 unemployment rate was 23.6 percent with an under-25 
rate of 55 percent (The Guardian, 2013). 
Policymakers have generally relied on the high spending 
levels of southern European countries to explain the crisis. For 
example, Greece did not tax (or adequately enforce existing 
taxation) sufficiently. It overspent and then it lied about its 
debt level. Portugal overspent and borrowed too much. Italy 
was wracked by a series of corrupt and fiscally incompetent 
governments (Knight, 2011). Spain exploded the myth that the 
Eurozone’s debt problems resulted from too much borrowing 
and profligate public spending. Unlike its Southern European 
neighbors, Spain had a balanced budget until the GFC in 2008. 
As its economy grew, its public debt to GDP ratio continued 
to fall (until 2007) unlike other Eurozone countries, including 
Germany. In large measure, Spain was a victim of the GFC and 
the collapse of the housing market which was driving its eco-
nomic growth (Knight, 2011). 
Spain adopted austerity measures similar to other finan-
cially strapped Eurozone nations, including large spending 
cuts, a freeze on public sector salaries and hiring, a 5 percent 
cut in government worker pay, an increase in the retirement age 
to 67, a 28 percent increase in the tobacco tax, and higher taxes 
for the rich. In 2012 the conservative government of Mariano 
Rajoy acceded to the pressure by Berlin and Brussels and intro-
duced another round of austerity measures that raised taxes, 
and cut spending on healthcare, education, and social services. 
Similar to Greece, Spain has experienced widespread anti-aus-
terity protests with makeshift tent cities organized by young 
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people fearing a grim future of unemployment (BBC News, 
2011a; Independent, 2011).
Iceland
Iceland had a different response to the GFC than many 
other indebted European nations. Before the GFC, Iceland was 
one of the richest nations in the world. Credit was abundant as 
Icelanders borrowed to buy consumer goods, summer houses 
and expensive vacations. Despite the warning signs, the gov-
ernment and Central Bank failed to regulate the financial elite 
that were driving the nation into near bankruptcy. 
In 2008, former Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced 
that Icelandic banks were insolvent and the country was in 
crisis. By then, Iceland’s debts were $110 billion, or ten times 
the government’s budget. Panic broke out as shops sold out 
and people stockpiled food. It was the start of a cycle that saw 
individuals and companies going bust. Haarde was forced to 
resign only days after his address (Kvam, 2011b).
In response to the crisis, the government nationalized the 
three largest Icelandic banks that had engaged in irresponsible 
financial speculation. Creditors were forced to absorb most 
bank-related losses. The government also imposed capital 
controls to protect the country’s currency and tightened finan-
cial regulation (Sherter, 2011). In 2008 Iceland received a $4.6 
billion loan by the IMF (Kvam, 2011a). 
Iceland protected welfare benefits before it began cutting 
budgets. Government officials used the Keynesian principle 
that the best way out of a recession is by boosting (not cutting) 
government spending and putting money in the pockets 
of people most likely to spend it (Sherter, 2011). To stimu-
late demand, the government increased the state minimum 
pension by 20 percent in 2009 and taxes were reduced for the 
lowest pensioners. This strategy also included levying higher 
taxes on the rich while protecting the economic interests of the 
poor. 
The Icelandic government implemented a debt relief 
program for businesses and households based on the belief 
that no one should have debt exceeding 110 percent of the 
value of their property (Kvam, 2011a). With the cooperation 
of banks and pension funds, the government helped highly 
indebted individuals and businesses reduce their debts. This 
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helped many individuals and businesses (who had sustain-
able loans before 2008) avoid the financial deterioration that 
occurred in some Eurozone countries. The debt relief program 
also allowed businesses to freeze their debts and continue op-
erating, although they could not incur further debts that might 
be needed for investment, growth and job creation.
Under pressure from the IMF to seek a balanced budget, 
a “stability pact” was reached in 2009 between government, 
trade unions and employer organizations that included sharp 
public sector spending cuts and tax hikes. Despite the stabi-
lizing economic reforms, the Social Democrats lost popular 
support by a series of policy mistakes, tax hikes, a leniency 
toward foreign creditors, soaring prices, capital controls that 
limited investments, and the government’s inability to deal 
with soaring household debt. In 2013 Icelandic, voters dumped 
the Social Democrats and returned a center-right government 
that promised protection of social security, and better welfare 
and job creation. This landslide election victory was also seen 
as a rejection of IMF-enforced austerity, the bailout terms and 
EU membership (Reuters, 2013b)
Austerity and the Repudiation of Keynesian Economics
In 2013, President Obama urged Greece to balance auster-
ity with growth as it seeks to recover from the financial crisis: 
“We know from history that those countries that are growing, 
those countries where employment is high and people are 
increasing their productivity … have an easier time reduc-
ing their debt burden than those countries where people are 
feeling hopeless” (Lederman & Olster, 2013). A similar plea 
was made by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner 
in 2011, who urged European governments to not withdraw 
stimulus spending that supports growth. The Europeans took 
a hard line in their response: “We don’t see any room for ma-
noeuver in the euro area which could allow us to launch new 
fiscal stimulus packages” (cited in Neuger & Christie, 2011). 
Europe’s austerity measures are bound together by a re-
jection of the basic Keynesian principles that have guided 
economic policy since the end of World War II. Whereas 
Keynesian economics requires governments to spend more 
in recessionary times, the Troika is forcing weaker Eurozone 
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countries to make deep cuts in public expenditures. As noted 
earlier, these austerity measures are rooted in the belief that 
the cause of Europe’s financial crisis lay in decades of reckless 
over-spending and over-borrowing to pay for overly generous 
welfare programs, pension systems and bloated public sectors. 
Rhetoric aside, before the GFC, Spain and Ireland ran budget 
surpluses and had low debt levels. While Spain’s debt was 31 
percent of its GDP, Ireland’s was only 12 percent. Both were 
below Germany’s debt level. Instead of profligate spending, 
these economies fell victim to a banking crisis and credit boom 
driven by cheap interest rates and irresponsible lending prac-
tices, which morphed into financial panic and a severe reces-
sion. The cause was not overspending per se, but credit and 
asset bubbles that proliferated in the wake of weak fiscal regu-
lation in the U.S. and Europe (Schwenninger, 2011). 
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman (2012) points out that eco-
nomic experts have been consistently wrong about the short-
run effects of budget deficits. For one, Eurozone deficits have 
not sent interest rates or inflation soaring. The Eurozone in-
flation rate fell to a meager 1.2 percent in mid-2013 and the 
central bank’s benchmark interest rate was less than 1 percent 
(Stoukas, 2013). While Krugman (2012) acknowledges the im-
portance of debt, he believes that public spending to lower un-
employment is more important.
The harsh austerity measures imposed on vulnerable 
Eurozone countries illustrate how disconnected economic 
technocrats and policymakers are from the suffering of ordi-
nary Europeans. Apart from marked differences in the sever-
ity of austerity measures—anywhere from light to devastating 
cuts—there are also striking similarities. Across the board, one 
hard-hit group are public sector workers, who in some cases, 
are being used as scapegoats for economic woes. Under some 
austerity measures, civil servants are facing pay cuts from 5 - 
25 percent; are having bonuses and holiday pay cut; are having 
their retirement age raised; are being put on unpaid involun-
tary furlough; and are having their work weeks extended, often 
without extra pay. Public sector freezes and massive layoffs 
are a common strategy for Eurozone governments desperate to 
shave budgets to meet EU targets. Among other things, these 
freezes and layoffs result in additional—and often impossible 
—workloads for the remaining public workers.
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Another hard-hit group are low- and moderate-income 
families who are experiencing cuts in welfare benefits, family 
support allowances, disability pensions, and governmental 
subsidies, including pharmaceutical and transportation subsi-
dies. This group is also facing higher user fees for public ser-
vices, especially in healthcare. 
European governments are pressured to make it appear 
that the pain and hardship of austerity measures are being 
spread evenly among the classes. As such, there is a presumed 
balance between spending cuts and higher taxes, although 
austerity measures seem to lean more towards spending cuts. 
While taxes are raised (and benefits cut) on small and medium 
incomes, there are also tax increases for corporations and the 
rich. (Ireland is an exception since the government has refused 
to raise the 12.5 percent corporate tax rate, the lowest in the 
EU.) Overall, the pretense of equitably socializing the pain 
of austerity is disingenuous, since tax increases and benefit 
cuts have a differential impact on various economic classes. 
For instance, a significant rise in the VAT (a common austerity 
measure to raise revenue) will have greater impact on a family 
earning $12,000 a year than one earning $500,000. The loss of a 
public sector job is not an equivalent hardship to a 50 percent 
luxury tax on a yacht or jet. Even a significant rise in the per-
sonal income tax of very high wage earners has far less impact 
on them than a small tax increase does on a low or moderate 
income family. While higher corporate taxes may appear equi-
table, the costs are often passed on in higher prices or cuts in 
the labor force.
There is a clear message in Eurozone austerity measures: 
Repayment to creditors is more important than pushing an 
economy into recession and high unemployment. Severe aus-
terity measures will invariably lead to lower levels of con-
sumption, higher unemployment, and greater social instabil-
ity as young workers lose hope of ever finding work. Paul 
Krugman (2011) points out that: 
… the nations now in crisis don’t have bigger welfare 
states than the nations doing well—if anything, the 
correlation runs the other way. Sweden, with its 
famously high benefits, is a star performer, one of the 
few countries whose GDP is now higher than it was 
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before the crisis. Meanwhile, before the crisis, “social 
expenditure”—spending on welfare-state programs—
was lower, as a percentage of national income, in all of 
the nations now in trouble than in Germany, let alone 
Sweden. Oh, and Canada, which has universal health 
care and much more generous aid to the poor than 
the United States, has weathered the crisis better than 
we have. The euro crisis, then, says nothing about the 
sustainability of the welfare state.... (p. 14)
Applying Structural Adjustment Principles  
to the Eurozone
The austerity-driven economic policies of the Troika share 
the same lineage as the shock policies the IMF forced upon 
developing countries as a prerequisite for loans and assistance. 
SAPs were mandated by the IMF and the World Bank as a con-
dition for developing countries to secure new loans or to lower 
interest rates on existing ones. The goal was to ensure repay-
ment of debt by reducing a country’s fiscal imbalances through 
spending cuts in health, education and social services; impos-
ing higher user fees on state services; privatizing and selling 
off state assets; deregulation; eliminating trade barriers; and 
by monetary reform. Borrowers who failed to meet these con-
ditions could be subjected to various fiscal penalties. Critics 
argued that financial threats to poor countries constituted 
blackmail, since they had no recourse but to comply. Critics 
of SAPs also claimed they compromise a nation’s sovereign-
ty, since an outside organization is dictating economic policy 
based on decisions made thousands of miles away (Karger, 
Iyani, & Shannon, 2007). Although SAPs were originally de-
signed to address the economic conditions of developing coun-
tries, a SAP-based approach has been applied to heavily in-
debted Eurozone nations. As such, the critiques of SAPs above 
all too frequently apply to some southern Eurozone nations as 
well. 
The IMF uses conditionality (i.e., conditions attached to a 
loan or aid) in developing countries to make sure loans are 
paid back (Dreher, 2004). With Eurozone borrowers, the con-
ditionalities are based on austerity measures that lower the 
deficit regardless of the consequences to employment or the 
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health and welfare of the population. In that sense, these con-
ditions are harsher than those imposed on developing coun-
tries, since the IMF and World Bank require these countries to 
submit a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) developed 
within a broad-based participatory process (Palast, 2003; World 
Bank, 2002). A PRSP is not something required of Eurozone 
borrowers.
There is a lack of evidence around the effectiveness of 
SAP-like approaches (Public Broadcasting System, n.d.). 
Sherle Schwenninger (2011) notes that in Greece the EU aus-
terity program has set in motion “a vicious cycle of recession 
and debt, whereby austerity leads to recession, which in turn 
produces even larger deficits and debt, which in turn prompts 
calls for more austerity… .” (need pp #)
Paul Krugman (2011) argues that: 
austerity has been a failure everywhere it has been 
tried: No country with significant debts has managed 
to slash its way back into the good graces of the 
financial markets. For example, Ireland is the good boy 
of Europe, having responded to its debt problems with 
savage austerity that has driven its unemployment rate 
to 14 percent. Yet the interest rate on Irish bonds is still 
above 8 percent—worse than Italy. (p. 14) 
The Dangerous Road
Forcing a severe SAP-like approach into the European 
context can have dangerous consequences. For instance, the 
slowdown in growth can exacerbate the current anti-immi-
grant backlash in Europe as jobs become scarcer and immi-
grants are seen as lower-paid competition. The dearth of jobs 
and benefits can also lead to an exaggerated form of national-
ism ripe for extreme right-wing or fascist political movements. 
Sigmar Gabriel, Chairman of the German Social Democratic 
Party, warns that the austerity measures being imposed on 
Europe indicate how little we learned from the rise of the Nazi 
Party. Gabriel points out that the Chancellor of the Weimar 
Republic, Heinrich Brüning, cut successive budgets during the 
Great Depression. The end result was six million unemployed 
Germans who were fodder for a rising Nazi party (McGreevey, 
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2011). A similar warning was issued by Nikos Hatzopoulos, 
president of a Greek trade union: 
the wave of spending cuts that drives the social insurance 
system to the brink of collapse and Greek society to 
extreme poverty, is not the way. The collapse of the 
welfare system could trigger extreme unprecedented 
social tension within Greece in a first phase and a 
domino effect across Europe. (CNC World, 2011)
Gabriel and Hatzopoulos’ warnings help explain the 
growth of far right-wing, anti-immigrant and pro-fascist parties 
across Europe. These groups include Austria’s Freedom Party 
(formerly led by Nazi sympathizer Jörg Haider); Belgium’s 
Flemish Block, Danish People’s Party, France’s National Front, 
Germany’s Republican Party, German People’s Union and 
National Democratic Party (largely neo-Nazi youth protest 
movements), Greece’s Hellenic Front, and Italy’s Northern 
League and National Alliance (pro-fascist). Other right-wing 
groups include Netherlands Pim Fortuyn’s List (LPF), and 
Liveable Netherlands, Norway’s Progress Party, Portugal’s 
Popular Party, Swiss People’s Party, and the British National 
Party (The Guardian, 2011).
Although France’s far-right National Front, now led by 
Marine Le Pen (daughter of the founder Jean-Marie Le Pen), 
has moderated its positions somewhat, it still espouses a halt to 
immigration, reclaiming French sovereignty from the European 
Union, restoring the death penalty, and implementing “nation-
al preference” to reserve jobs, financial aid and public housing 
for French citizens over foreigners (Crumley, 2011). In a sur-
prise vote, Le Pen placed third in the 2012 French presidential 
election with almost 18 percent of the vote. 
Hungary is an epicenter of the neofascist movement in 
Europe. A 2012 survey by the Anti-Defamation League found 
that more than 60 percent of Hungarian respondents said that 
Jews “talk too much about the Holocaust” and 73 percent said 
Jews have too much power in the business world. Compared to 
2009, the survey also found that “levels of anti-Semitism have 
increased most dramatically in Hungary, as well as in the UK 
and Spain” (Jovanovski, 2013). 
Hungary’s Jobbik Party was founded in 2003 by a group 
of Protestant and Catholic university students. It came to in-
ternational attention when it received almost 15 percent of the 
votes in the European Parliament elections. In 2010 it became 
Hungary’s third largest political party, capturing almost 17 
percent of the vote. Jobbik is a virulently anti-Semitic and anti-
Roma (Gypsy) party that proposes to abolish abortion, re-es-
tablish the death penalty, and create a special police unit to deal 
with “gypsy delinquency.” Jobbik also operates a paramilitary 
arm called the Hungarian Guard (Hockenos, 2010; Ostrovsky, 
2013; Stancil, 2009). Marton Gyöngyösi, a Jobbik MP, typified 
the anti-Semitism when he called for the creation of a “regis-
try” of Jewish MPs and government officials in Hungary. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, Hungary’s public debt is the 
highest in central and eastern Europe, and its 2012 unemploy-
ment rate was almost 11 percent (nearly 30 percent for those 
under 25). It has been under the EU’s deficit management 
procedure since 2006, the longest of any country (Globalpost, 
2013). 
German economic analyst Michael Mross observes that 
“Austerity means cuts. That means that you have cut the 
income of the poorest, that the social welfare will be cut down” 
(RT.com, 2011). In a modern industrial society, the welfare state 
acts as a buffer against absolute deprivation; promotes greater 
social mobility through affordable education, thereby making 
class lines more porous; redistributes resources; encourages 
consumption by providing social welfare benefits; and en-
hances economic productivity by providing affordable health 
care. 
Conclusion
Europe’s harsh austerity measures are counterproduc-
tive since they are leading to a cycle of recession, high unem-
ployment, greater social instability, and accelerated income 
inequality. In the end, it is becoming increasingly harder for 
Eurozone nations to repay their debts in the context of their 
contracting or moribund economies. After years of harsh aus-
terity measures, countries like Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland and 
Italy have yet to return to economic health. If the developing 
world’s experience with SAPs is any indication, the prognosis 
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for achieving a strong economy through “expansionary aus-
terity” is extremely poor. More likely, continuing severe aus-
terity measures will only lead to more hardship. As the politi-
cal demonstrations illustrate, Europe’s population—especially 
the young—are increasingly less able to see a light at the end 
of the economic tunnel. 
The stagnant or deteriorating economies of indebted 
Eurozone nations has caused the EU to rethink its austerity ap-
proach and begin to focus on stimulus and growth. European 
Commission officials are calling on member states to focus 
on increasing competitiveness by growth-boosting economic 
reforms. It is also asking member states to focus on lowering 
youth unemployment from their current disastrously high 
levels. At the same time, they are urging austerity measures 
to continue (Petroff, 2013). In the end, novel solutions—based 
on growth and stimulus—are needed for countries to rebound 
from their financial calamity without eviscerating their health, 
welfare, and education of its citizens.
Note: For consistency, all currency has been converted to U.S. dollars. 
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